Transcription: were certain difficulties in detail here, which were made the most of by unregenerate governments, but there was not the enormous difficulty which would now confront any Federation, of building up at the same time an effective army, navy, and air force, to meet attack from without. This difficulty is not, of course, due to the Federal idea in itself; it is the result of the general deterioration of the international relations since 1931.  At that time all the nations were acting together.  The plans for Reduction and Limitation of Armaments affected the whole world, and, though the good faith of certain nations was suspect, it was not thought likely that any nation would deliberately stand out from an agreement accepted by the rest and thus proclaim itself hostis humani generis.  Now the reverse may be taken as practically certain.  There will be powerful armed enemies outside the Federation - if not secret enemies inside as well. Let us next consider the probable or possible extent of the Federation, how many nations and what nations are likely to be induced to join.  The size of the structure vitally affects its whole character.  A World Federation or World Government, such as William Archer conceived in his Great Analysis (1911) and Mr. Wells has often commended, would be an almost divine assurance for Peace and many other good things.  But we are thinking of practical matters.  A wide Federation of what Mr. Streit calls 'democratic' nations,1 based on the British Empire and the United States together with France and the five Scandinavians - and, as he then thought, perhaps Russia - would constitue an extremely wide and strong peace block, though it would be almost certain to give rise to a rival anti-democratic block of equal or approximately equal strength.  The result would be a Balance of Power, not a united world.  Still more would this danger apply to the formation of any smaller Federation on similar ideological lines. Here indeed we strike the essential difference between a Federa- 1 I would sooner myself call them 'constitutional' nations.  By a constitutional state I mean a state in which every citizen must obey the law, as contrasted with one in which the Führer or Duce and his agents are above the law and conse- quently the ordinary man is not free.  Cf. the decision of the German High Court after the 'purge' of June 30th.  I prefer the term to 'democratic' on two grounds: (1) the Dictatorships also are 'democratic': that is, they claim to be based on the will of the whole people and always win their plebiscites; a result obtained partly by terrorism and partly by mass advertisement, such as the ubiquitous portraits of Stalin and Mussolini; (2) the term 'democratic' is associated with party politics and has many implications which are irrelevant to the issue of Law v. Anarchy or Freedom v. Despotism. The two real essentials are Law and Freedom. 10 tion and a League of Nations.  Both are attempts at Security: both are cemented by fear of some common danger.  But for a Federation to be successful, or to maintain itself at all, its members must have some basis in common interests, traditions, habits of thought, language, geographical continuity or the like.  It must consist of like-minded States which have no differences likely to lead to war.  The essence of the League of Nations is that it brings together at a common table the nations that have grave differences, whether of interests or habits of thought, and are therefore possible enemies.  There is danger of them going to war, unless they sit and work together in order to avoid war.  The League aims at peace between possible enemies; the limited Federation only at self- defence against possible enemies. What Federation or Federations can we reasonably hope to see formed after the war?  If Mr. Streit were, by a happy contingency, President of the United States, with a firm majority in both houses, we might hope for a complete reversal of American policy; it is also, of course, conceivable that the disasters wrought by the present war may be so terrible as to convince the American people that they must throw in their lot with the like-minded nations in Europe; but for the present, the less we count on any possibility of American partnership the better.  Russia, which Mr. Streit counted as doubtful, must now, for obvious reasons, be omitted. That reduces the Federation by about two-thirds; but we still have left Great Britain, the Dominions, France and the other 'democratic' - or law-abiding - States of Western Europe.  That would be a very powerful unit, and, we must recognize, an essentially peaceful and non-aggressive unit.  Its ideological opponents, such as Russia, Japan, Germany, Italy, would be more than likely to quarrel with one another if they tried permanently to unite against it.  But how fair is such a federation practicable?  Can we, in the first place, count on the British Dominions? We must remember that they have steadily refused all plans of Imperial Federation.  They will make no treaty which might, as they conceive, give Great Britain a power of involving them in war or interfering with their perfect freedom in the matter of tariffs and immigration laws.  Much less would they, as things are, think of giving such power to a Federation of foreign nations.  Without the Dominions, Great Britain would find it almost impossible to join the Federation; she would probably have to be content with some close liaison with it, not amounting to membership.  And in that case not much would remain of the Federation.  The Western democracies left alone could hardly defend themselves. Again, if we put ourselves in the position of Holland or Belgium 11

Transcription: si desfatandusa in sunetul melodios al muziceë, erå de le era sete lua de bine câte un pâhârel de bere rece de pe gheata- eara de avea alta sete, incà so stämpärä avand de brateta- pe acea mai iubita. Karà en surmanul de mine de acestea de tote am fast inchis si párásit, am fort silit in loc de acesteade tote sa ma multâmese en sbierätele salbatéce ale Arabilor si a Chinezilor, ce audindule te infiora pânì la osì, accasta ira murica mea si a consoldatilor mei de pe vapor. "Ce sà faci rabdà si taci" ca din zicala, imi gândeam in mine, ce sa fac pote aça mio fost impartit de la ursita. Darà ori si cum, totusi rau mio mai Impartit, ca cœnd meau fort lumea mai dragà mau scos din- tre omeninosti si man bågat printre; Ariabi Negri. (harapi) singalezi, Indieni, Malaici, Chinezi, Japani, si Dzeu u mai stie câte feluri, fára sa priceapà omul de la ei vreux ouvant Domne ore ce tam gresit? de asa reu mai pedepsit, mà intreban de multe ori en sângur ca un smintit de minte, si cugetànd la noi acasà oftam greu si inadusit mai alles cùnd erain in post. singur, carâ neavánd cine sà ma mangaie priveam la valu- rile inspumegate si asa privind numai ce vedèm esind din ele cäte un peste sau alt animal de mare, tot Dzen u. trime- tea si pre acestca spre mangaierea mea, ca privindui pre ei sámi easá gândurile din cap. Daca as voii en sa scriu tote câte mi saudat de cap si am vådut in càlatorica mea atunci asi putea umplea treicartica accasta, dari eu nuvoiex

Transcription: Council. As a matter of practice, moreover, most current questions are referred to committees, and the committee's report when it arrives  before Council is, by a customary rule, almost always accepted.  Awkward as it sounds, the unanimity rule has very seldom caused any practical inconvenience, and has certainly some very great merits.  The principle 'If I must, I won't, but if I needn't I don't mind' is far from unimportant in dealing with individuals, but has much greater power with such sensitive and irrational animals as nations.  They may agree, as they did in the Covenant, to being compelled to fulfil definite pledges which they have voluntarily given; but they will hardly agree to accept before- hand th decision of a majority of foreigners on all questions that may arise in their future external policy. This brings us to the second point, the actual powers of the Federal Council.  The Federation being a unit, and an armed unit, it alone has a Foreign Policy. Its constituent parts have only their local police.  Thus Foreign Policy, Military Policy and organization, and the Financial measures necessary for these purposes must be the business of the Council. Later on it may well deal with questions of currency, tariffs, migration, economic policy and the like. This seems logical, yet I see some difficulties. In a geographical and cultural continuum, whether large like the United States or small like Switzerland, the individual States or cantons may not feel the need of special foreign policies.  But with a large mixed Federation it is different.  The Government of India makes treaties with Pathan chiefs beyond its borders.  Australia has special relations with China and Japan.  Norway and Sweden have points to settle about their arctic frontiers. I suspect that in any Federal body great caution would have to be shown in two respects: the central authority must allow a good deal of freedom to the constituent nations in respect to their local or special foreign relations, and even where it had to assert its will it would be wise to use persuasion and pressure rather than absolute com- pulsion.  The makers of the Covenant, in considering what was to be done if a Member State failed to carry out an award or decision of the League, were content to say that 'the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto'. The less absolute compulsion there is the wider will be the sphere of action sur- rendered to the central body. At this point we are inevitably confronted with the most vital and most difficult of all international peace problems, the substi- tution of a central defence force for the competitive national forces of the Member States.  The United States and the Swiss Federa- 8 tion have solved this problem: it was made possible in the one case by a common language and history, a common law and a great unmilitary tradition; in the other by the pressure on all sides of common dangers.  The case for such unification is very strong. The States Members of the Federation have renounced any idea of going to war with each other; what possible reason can they have for separate - and competitive - armaments? Disarmament is an obvious corollary to the perpetual peace-treaty implied in any Federation or even in the Covenant as modified by the Kellogg Pact.  The members of the Federation must clearly disarm; but what of the Federation itself? It will presumably be confronted by outside Powers, and very strong ones, which have not disarmed, and must therefore have its own forces for collective defence. A Federal army, navy and air forces seem inevitably to follow. Yet here again tact and psychology must almost certainly be allowed to count for more than logic.  In 1910 the American Senate unanimously recommended the formation of a great international fleet for the preservation of world peace; but the discussions contemplated a composite fleet made up of the British, German, French and American contingents, not a unified mass of inter- national ships with international commanders.  There is a great difference between abolishing the British navy so as to make an international navy instead, and obtaining an agreement that Great Britain shall contribute such-and-such a naval force to the common defence.  The first seems to me quite impossible; the second possible, though difficult and of course less satisfactory.  I must leave to those better qualified the task of working out arrangments for the possible location and command of the Federal force.  The organization of the Roman legions might give some hints.  A beginning might be made, for instance, by maintaining a number of national professional armies and moving them round for training from one country to another.  The Air Force might similarly consist of national contingents with all aerodromes strictly internationalized.  It is important to notice that the problem of a Federal Force is much more difficult than that which baffled the world Disarmament Conference of 1931.  In that case the problem was manageable: all the nations were present, and they could all disarm together.  The object was so to reduce armaments that no nation should have the weapons which would enable it to invade a neighbour's frontiers.  This involved among other things the abolition of all national air forces and the inter- nationalization of all civil aviation; next, as a safeguard, lest the civil machines should be transformed suddenly into bombers, the maintenance of an international fleet of fighting planes.  There 9

Transcription: governments popularly elected and therefore roughly representing the preferences of the people, select by their own judgement the most suitable individuals to represent the country on the international body, seems likely to produce a better result. The methods of the governments have varied. To the League Council, of course, they send the Foreign Secretary or some representative chosen by him. To the Assembly the British Governments since I925 have sent strictly party delegations, which is perhaps a mistake.  The Belgian Government and some others made a point of sending to the Assembly a really national delegation, with members of all three parties; the French often selected permanent delegates with special knowledge.  Experience would probably show what method was best, but a certain elasticity is useful. The election of this Council by direct popular voting is regarded as essential by most Federalists, on the ground that the Council then represents the will of real human beings and not the artificial units called Governments. This, it is argued, is an immense safe- guard. At the League of Nations, the State-Members speak as independent units. If any great difference arises on the Council of the League, it is a difference between armed States, and constitutes inevitably a danger of war. For example, when Mussolini and his friends decided to make war on Abyssinia, the effect at the League was that 'Italy' decided to make war, and 'Great Britain' and other nations, as wholes, objected. The truth of the matter was that some Italians thought one way and some another, and so did various Englishmen, Frenchmen, Dutchmen and the rest. It was the fact that the Government spoke for the whole nation and had an army to do its bidding that enabled Mussolini to defy the League.  Under a Federal system the question would have lain quite outside the province of the Italian Government. It would have been vetoed at once by the Federal Government, and there would have been no national Italian army to defy the Federal Government and make war. The war would not have taken place. There is much force in this.  On the other hand, a Federal Constitution is not an infallible remedy. A strong difference of opinion and interest between the inhabitants of the Southern and Northern States of the American Union led to a long and bloody civil war.  The recent civil war in Spain, again, which violently divided the sympathies, not of States but of individuals, in many parts of Europe, might well have been just as intractable under a Federal system. There remains, moreover, the fundamental and overwhelming difficulty of devising any system of counting the votes of nations of the Federal Council which will be either acceptable or effective, 6 To go boldly by population and the principle of 'one man one vote' would give us, on Mr. Streit's figures, some 47 votes for Britain, 41 for France, 43 for Italy, 72 (at least) for Germany, 120 for the United States, 300 for India, 8 for Holland, and not quite 3 for Norway.  Can one imagine Holland and Norway, can one even imagine Britain and France, accepting such a plan? The obvious alternative is representation by States, each State to count as one.  But that is equally unreasonable: one cannot see the people of England and France submitting to be outvoted and compelled to adopt a policy which they did not approve by a concourse of Danes, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians.  I agree with Sir John, that some other method will have to be found, if voting is to be maintained at all.  The trouble is that any plan which demands that the people of a free country shall agree to a consti- tution under which their whole foreign policy shall be subject to an international body, and they may be at any time compelled by a bare majority of foreigners to pursue a policy which they hate, is almost sure to be generally rejected, and quite sure, if accepted, to break down.  One can devise other systems based on votes, such as the requirement of a two-thirds majority, or of a majority in two Houses, one elected on the basis of one man one vote, the other on that of one State one vote; or again on a majority of both the great nations and the small nations, like that now obtaining in the election of Judges of the International Court; but all involve a surrender of the original claim made by the Federal idea, and all make for delays and deadlocks.  It might be possible to ask the small States to form special groups which should count as equal to the large single States - a proposal which made them wild with indignation in 1918.  It was only after long study and discussion at that time that eventually the whole idea of decision by majority vote was given up, and the so-called 'unanimity rule' adopted. This means that the States-Members of the League come together definitely bound by specific agreements on particular points, viz. renouncing war and accepting third-party judgement, but otherwise each member preserves his freedom.  The 'unanimity rule' does not, of course, amount to a 'Liberum veto'. If a proposal came to the Council of the League for a joint enterprise, let us say, to reclaim the Sahara, and some members did not agree, there is nothing to prevent the others going on with the scheme by themselves. There are also certain necessary exceptions to the unanimity rule. Questions of procedure, which of course must be settled one way or another, are determined by majority vote.  In international disputes, again, the supposed votes of the disputants themselves are not counted, and so do not disturb the unanimity of the B 7

Description: Ratne bojne dopisnice (Feldpost) bile su najfunkcionalnije sredstvo komuniciranja vojnika sa porodicom tokom Prvog svjetskog rata. Većinom su bile cenzurisane i na njima se nalazio pečat vojne cenzure, regimentalni pečat i pečat vojne pošte. Na velikom broju dopisnica nalazila su se sva tri pečata, međutim, nerijetko se nalazio samo jedan ili dva. Poznato je da su vojnici bili strogo kažnjavani ukoliko su svjesno pisali bilo šta što otkriva vojne tajne. Pisati su mogli samo vojnici. Sve što bi napisali davalo bi se vojnom cenzoru da to pregleda i tek kad on odobri moglo se poslati porodici. Čitajući pisma, može se uvidjeti da su ona poprilično štura, te da su dobro pazili o svemu šta je napisano, upravo iz razloga da bi izbjegli probleme sa nadređenim. Feldpost sistem Austro-ugarske Monarhije, omogućavao je vojnicima da komuniciraju sa svojim najbližima. Sačuvane razglednice i pisma pružaju lični pogled na to kako su pojedini vojnici doživljavali sukobe. || Devet bojnih dopisnica (Feldpost)

Description: Este un volum de jurnal din cele trei deţinute de Biblioteca Judeţeană Octavian Goga Cluj. || Dumitru Nistor, ţăran din satul Năsăud s-a născut în 1893. Visând din copilărie să călătorească şi să vadă ţări străine, în 1912, când vine vremea “număraşului” (recrutării) el cere să fie primit nu în miliţia ardeleană, unde erau recrutaţi de obicei românii, ci în marina austro-ungară. Terminând şcoala de marină, după o călătorie la Viena, este îmbarcat ca Geschützvormeister (“primul îndreptător de tun”) pe vasul SMS Kaiserin Elisabeth, cu destinaţia Asia. Prins de război în Marea Chinei, crucişătorul Kaiserin Elisabeth participă la câteva bătălii navale, pentru ca în 2 noiembrie 1914 să se hotărască scufundarea lui. Echipajul pierde şi lupta terestră, este luat prizonier de japonezi şi transportat în arhipelagul nipon. Timp de zece luni, ţăranul-marinar din Năsăud va fi prizonier într-o mănăstirea buddhistă din Himeji, iar apoi mutat într-un lagăr, construit special pentru prizonierii germani şi austrieci, la Aonogahara, nu departe de Kobe, unde va rămâne până la sfârşitul anului 1919.

Description: Potrošačka kartica sadrži podatke o osobama koje su se prijavljivale radi raspodjele živežnih namirnica u Zagrebu tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata. Sadrži podatke o podnosiocu prijave (ime i prezime, adresa) te osobama koje se nalaze u kućanstvu, njihova imena, godine rođenja, odnos prema podnosiocu prijave, zanimanje i mjesto rada.

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