Transcription: P1/7 (3) -5- the League as a matter that has lost all interest to us. At the worst, it is a bargaining card;  at the best, it may be something immensely more. Finally, I would like to draw attention to one minor point of practical importance.  If it is agreed, as I believe it is, that the existing League machinery ought, for the present, to be preserved so far as possible, this implies for H.M.G. not merely that they should do nothing to destroy it but that they should do what they can in a positive sense to keep it working;  in particular that they should encourage the holding of meetings of League Com- mittees, and take part in them as fully as possible and with the best possible representatives.

Transcription: P1/7 (3) -4- I venture to think that a presentation of our "peace aims" on these lines - not forgetting those which have already been declared, including "disarmament", which can never come without an effective organisation for peace - would be a considerable advance on anything which has yet been stated;  that this advance would involve no risk, nor raise difficulties with the French, since it does not com- mit us to any one form of organisation to the exclusion of others;  and that it would be a useful step from the point of view of neutral opinion, and a sound basis for conversa- tion with the United States. And, of course, we must never allow the "non-belligerents" to forget that any international organisation for the common benefit depends first on one condition, namely the victory of the Allies. As regards the League of Nations, I would only say this.  We cannot tell how much of the Covenant system we may then want, or be able, to maintain, alter or scrap. It may even be possible, unlikely as that may seem at the moment, to find again the creative energy of 1918-1919, when General Smuts could say: "I believe the world is now ripe for the greatest advance in human government in the history of mankind".  In any case, it is greatly to be hoped that neither in its declarations, its negotiations, or even its internal convictions, will H.M.G. prematurely decide to abandon either the Covenant itself or the various forms of machinery which have grown up for its execution. They have at least the merit of existing, and experience knows how great would be the difficulties in drawing up a new agreement to take their place.  That difficulty will certainly be much increased it it is decided to start by settling the peace terms in the narrower sense, and only after that begin to seek agreement in international organisation. To maintain them for the time being should, I think, be no embarrassment;  they no longer involve political implications, save in so far as they represent  -  and are regarded by Germany as representing   -  a certain degree of common interest between ourselves and some two-score neutral States.  In talking to the United States I am convinced that it is a mistake to treat our membership of

Transcription: P1/7 (3) -3- We are certainly also entitled to remember that the possibilities of effective work under both heads will be vitally affected by the attitude of the United States.  It would be obviously unwise to say this in public, and there is, I suppose, no danger of any responsible Minister doing so.  But in confidential talks the point ought to be put in the forefront;  and if this is to be possible it means that we must be reasonably clear in our minds what we are ourselves prepared, if possible, to work for.  There seems to be some risk that the United States will satisfy their conscience by offering to take a large share in the material side of reconstruction.  I believe it would be a very short- sighted policy indeed on the part of the Allies to give the slightest encouragement to this "escapist" plan.  The material restoration of Europe will be of little use if the countries concerned are to be still in the mood of 1936- 1939  - each hoping to keep out of trouble and looking the other way when trouble occurs that does not directly threaten it. (The fact that these problems must be already included in the forthcoming conversations with Mr. Sumner Welles is a further commentary on the idea that Ministers are too busy with the war to think of the post-war organisation). It is not, of course, suggested that we should invite the United States to do what both the great Parties were fully resolved to do in 1918 - what the Senate itself was ready by a great majority to do in 1920 when the Republican reservations to the Covenant were rejected by President Wilson.  But opinion in war time can move fast;  we should surely be most foolish if we now take it for granted that Anglo-Franco-American agreement to keep with others the world's peace is necessarily and for ever unattainable; and we have surely the right and duty to point out that, when the time comes, the American attitude will deeply affect our own possibilities. As regards the method, we could utilise very effectively (1) the declaration made by Mr. Butler in the Council on December 16th, and (2) the very important passage in the Pope's Christmas message about international organisations for the maintenance of peace - in which he speaks of the building anew, or restoration, of such organisations; of the heavy responsibilities they have carried and the grave difficulties they have met;  and the need to learn from the lessons of the past.

Transcription: P1/7 (3) -2- in inverted commas because I believe that if the Governments ever begin to try to put these ideas to the practical test, i.e. to formulate them in a Treaty in which a large number of States would willingly participate, they will inevitably find themselves working on lines which are substantially the same as those of the Covenant of the League). On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent us from declaring the principles which we intend, so far as may be in our power, to see established and maintained after the war.  And remembering the purpose we have in mind in dis- cussing this matter, i.e. a war purpose, I suggest that the two main principles on which emphasis should be laid are: 1.  The peaceful settlement of disputes      and prevention of aggression; 2.  The improvement of the individual     standard of living. It must be recognised that for each of these purposes organised international action is a necessary condition. Indeed, if anything said on the subject by representatives of H.M.G. is to be convincing, more especially to the neutral countries, it is necessary to admit and declare that in both cases there must be much more effective international co-operation than existed before the war, and that the British Empire in particular will be prepared, if others will play their part, to make much greater "sacrifices" (in fact they will be no sacrifices at all to the nation as a whole) than we were willing to do before the war. Though we are bound to make our declarations conditional on the participation of others, I think it would be highly desirable to make plain that we do not expect exactly the same engagements to be taken by weak nations as by strong ones.  In their present mood the smaller European powers would see no attraction in the promise of a system in which they would be expected to take immediate risks. In 1919 they were ready and willing to do so, but the withdrawal of the United States and subsequently the conduct of the more powerful members of the League changed all that; only a fresh growth of confidence can restore it and this will not be achieved by words.  It is here that Anglo-French leadership may truly be the nucleus of a new order, if it means leadership in willingness to take risks in the common interest.

Description: Ratne bojne dopisnice (Feldpost) bile su najfunkcionalnije sredstvo komuniciranja vojnika sa porodicom tokom Prvog svjetskog rata. Većinom su bile cenzurisane i na njima se nalazio pečat vojne cenzure, regimentalni pečat i pečat vojne pošte. Na velikom broju dopisnica nalazila su se sva tri pečata, međutim, nerijetko se nalazio samo jedan ili dva. Poznato je da su vojnici bili strogo kažnjavani ukoliko su svjesno pisali bilo šta što otkriva vojne tajne. Pisati su mogli samo vojnici. Sve što bi napisali davalo bi se vojnom cenzoru da to pregleda i tek kad on odobri moglo se poslati porodici. Čitajući pisma, može se uvidjeti da su ona poprilično štura, te da su dobro pazili o svemu šta je napisano, upravo iz razloga da bi izbjegli probleme sa nadređenim. Feldpost sistem Austro-ugarske Monarhije, omogućavao je vojnicima da komuniciraju sa svojim najbližima. Sačuvane razglednice i pisma pružaju lični pogled na to kako su pojedini vojnici doživljavali sukobe. || Devet bojnih dopisnica (Feldpost)

Description: Este un volum de jurnal din cele trei deţinute de Biblioteca Judeţeană Octavian Goga Cluj. || Dumitru Nistor, ţăran din satul Năsăud s-a născut în 1893. Visând din copilărie să călătorească şi să vadă ţări străine, în 1912, când vine vremea “număraşului” (recrutării) el cere să fie primit nu în miliţia ardeleană, unde erau recrutaţi de obicei românii, ci în marina austro-ungară. Terminând şcoala de marină, după o călătorie la Viena, este îmbarcat ca Geschützvormeister (“primul îndreptător de tun”) pe vasul SMS Kaiserin Elisabeth, cu destinaţia Asia. Prins de război în Marea Chinei, crucişătorul Kaiserin Elisabeth participă la câteva bătălii navale, pentru ca în 2 noiembrie 1914 să se hotărască scufundarea lui. Echipajul pierde şi lupta terestră, este luat prizonier de japonezi şi transportat în arhipelagul nipon. Timp de zece luni, ţăranul-marinar din Năsăud va fi prizonier într-o mănăstirea buddhistă din Himeji, iar apoi mutat într-un lagăr, construit special pentru prizonierii germani şi austrieci, la Aonogahara, nu departe de Kobe, unde va rămâne până la sfârşitul anului 1919.

Description: Potrošačka kartica sadrži podatke o osobama koje su se prijavljivale radi raspodjele živežnih namirnica u Zagrebu tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata. Sadrži podatke o podnosiocu prijave (ime i prezime, adresa) te osobama koje se nalaze u kućanstvu, njihova imena, godine rođenja, odnos prema podnosiocu prijave, zanimanje i mjesto rada.

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