Transcription: si desfatandusa in sunetul melodios al muziceë, erå de le era sete lua de bine câte un pâhârel de bere rece de pe gheata- eara de avea alta sete, incà so stämpärä avand de brateta- pe acea mai iubita. Karà en surmanul de mine de acestea de tote am fast inchis si párásit, am fort silit in loc de acesteade tote sa ma multâmese en sbierätele salbatéce ale Arabilor si a Chinezilor, ce audindule te infiora pânì la osì, accasta ira murica mea si a consoldatilor mei de pe vapor. "Ce sà faci rabdà si taci" ca din zicala, imi gândeam in mine, ce sa fac pote aça mio fost impartit de la ursita. Darà ori si cum, totusi rau mio mai Impartit, ca cœnd meau fort lumea mai dragà mau scos din- tre omeninosti si man bågat printre; Ariabi Negri. (harapi) singalezi, Indieni, Malaici, Chinezi, Japani, si Dzeu u mai stie câte feluri, fára sa priceapà omul de la ei vreux ouvant Domne ore ce tam gresit? de asa reu mai pedepsit, mà intreban de multe ori en sângur ca un smintit de minte, si cugetànd la noi acasà oftam greu si inadusit mai alles cùnd erain in post. singur, carâ neavánd cine sà ma mangaie priveam la valu- rile inspumegate si asa privind numai ce vedèm esind din ele cäte un peste sau alt animal de mare, tot Dzen u. trime- tea si pre acestca spre mangaierea mea, ca privindui pre ei sámi easá gândurile din cap. Daca as voii en sa scriu tote câte mi saudat de cap si am vådut in càlatorica mea atunci asi putea umplea treicartica accasta, dari eu nuvoiex

Transcription: which I am most definitely at issue with Sir John Fischer Williams, Article XVI lays down that Should any member of the League resort to war in disre- gard of its Covenant . . . it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League: This in my opinion is absolutely right.  It does not mean that the aggressor is actually at war with the other members, but that they are free to take against the aggressor any measures that are legiti- mate in war.  The article goes on to specify the measures that may or must be taken. First, all members must immediately subject the aggressor to 'a severance of all trade or financial relations'.  Morally, this is an excommunication of a member of the Society who has broken the most fundamental rule of the Society, as a Christian Church might excommunicate a member who had proclaimed himself 'anti- God'.  Practically, it is boycott.  It means that the aggressor is deprived of all the supplies necessary for carrying on war; unless he has already accumulated sufficient material to win the war with, he must stop and confess himself powerless.  (The common notion that this is an attempt to starve the population is a complete error, based on memories of the effect of the blockade on Germany at the end of the World War at a time when the food supplies of Europe had been destroyed by four years of continuous devastation.) Secondly, provision is made for possible military action in case the aggressor resists.  The Council is to recommend what contribu- tions different members are to make to the necessary forces. Thirdly, the members will 'support one another in financial and economic measures' and 'in resisting special measures aimed at one of their number' by the aggressor; fourthly, they may - and certainly should - expel the Covenant-breaker from the League. Now I believe these principles to be right.  All that was needed was that, in the words of the Geneva Protocol, the Governments should 'co-operate loyally and effectively' in carrying them out. Still, I do not think the measures for their execution have been sufficiently prepared or defined. As to the one universal obligation, it is essential to any Society of Nations whatever.  There can be no Society in which the members are free to help a Covenant-breaking aggressor by supplying him with means of war.  The Society was formed for mutual protection: it would be absurd if members were free to take part in the destruction of one another.  The obligation not to assist the aggressor must be unconditional and universal. 18 The excommunication, however, cannot entirely make unneces- sary the use of military measures.  For one thing, the aggressor may resist, and seek to take by force the mines or oilwells that he needs. For another, the excommunication will not be an effective sanction of the law unless it is universal, or nearly so; if one or two weaker brethren yield to the temptation of making high profits by selling goods to the Covenant-breaker, military measures will have to be taken to reinforce the boycott.  Here comes a new difficulty. What nations are capable of effective military action - I use the word military to cover war of all kinds - and in what circumstances would they, or some of them, be willing to fight?  This surely needs previous agreement. Some nations might wish - and possibly be allowed - to contract out of military obligations altogether.  Some would wish to limit their obligations to certain circumstances or certain regions.  There is force in the claim of the self-styled 'realists' that a nation can only be expected to fight where its own interests are involved; the mischief is that the 'realists' generally take too narrow a view of a nation's interests. Strictly speaking 'Peace is indivisible'; that is, an outbreak of war anywhere is likely to affect both the economy and security of every member of the League.  Nor should we underrate the enormous influence for general peace and justice which would result from one definite prevention of a major war, or defeat of a major aggression, by League action.  But we may recall that in the early days of the League the Canadians explained that they could not undertake to send troops to defend Bulgaria and were told that of course they would not be expected to do so; the neigh- bours of Bulgaria would do the police work.  All are interested in the preservation of peace; but all are not interested equally in peace everywhere, nor yet equally able to act everywhere.  As a matter of fact, the two fatal inroads on the peace system were made in regions very remote from the interests of the majority of League members, Manchuria and Abyssinia.  The proper solution of such difficulties seems to be to have an agreement beforehand what members of the League will specifically undertake police duties in particular regions.  Abyssinia for instance would have been in a much stronger position if there had been a special sub-treaty binding certain powers with interests in Africa to act as the League's police force for African affairs.  Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, South Africa would have been directly responsible; the obligation would have been specific, and would not have been blurred by being equally incumbent on a great number of nations to whom Abyssinia meant nothing at all.  Had there 19

Transcription: by relieving it of all the obligations which might be inconvenient to an ambitious power, intent on schemes of conquest.  Such a power might find it conducive to its prestige to display itself at international conferences, and useful to have easy acces to the League's abundant sources of information; while the rest of the world might hope that the habit of regular consultation and co- operation with civilized nations might make such a power gradually more humane.  It might for instance be made to realize the econo- mic and military strength of the peaceful Federation more than it would if left in isolation.  The argument has some force; but I confess I should be very reluctant to make so great a surrender.  It would mean leaving all the world outside the Federation a prey to every ambitious aggressor.  It would leave Japan free to ravage China, Italy free to drop poison gas on Abyssinian peasants, Russia to destroy Finland, Paraguay and Bolivia to fight their fill over the Chaco. 'But, after all,' it will be argued, 'if in spite of the Covenant which definitely forbade them, they have done so now; what is the good of forbidding them again?' The argument may be strengthened by another consideration. It may be said: 'At present the members of the League are pledged to defend one another, but they break or evade that pledge with increasing shamelessness.  Would it not be better to drop all pretence; let them meet at the League for purposes of diplomacy and business co-operation, but provide for their safety quite separately by means of competitive armaments and such military alliances as may suit their special interests.  These will, in most cases, be the various Federations.' The objections to this view are twofold.  First, the said Feder- ations are not strong enough to ensure peace for themselves, much less for any nation not included in their circle.  Secondly, by making war a mere matter of interest and removing from it the stigma of moral condemnation, we should be throwing away the greatest moral advance made by the civilized world for centuries. The League system has definitely established for the first time in public law the principle that aggressive war is a crime against the international community.  That principle is, as a matter of fact, true.  One need not go to the churches or the philosophic societies to ascertain the fact.  It accords with the conscience of the ordinary decent man throughout the world.  It is shown by the ordinary newspaper comments in every nation on the aggressive wars which have been common of late.  It is shown by the wild mendacity with which aggressors always try to conceal their aggression. It will be a terrible surrender of a moral advance already gained if we let that principle go, and admit 'wholesale murder 16 for the sake of gain', in John Morley's phrase, as a normal and legitimate mode of behaviour, though doubtless objectionable to the victim. Rather than make that surrender I consider that we must main- tain the rules of the Covenant.  If through bad fortune or bad statesmanship they have been allowed to lapse, with the result not of 'keeping this country out of trouble' while others suffered, but of plunging England and France themselves into a peculiarly disastrous war, they must be re-established.  The policy of con- nivance at anarchy has proved a dead failure.  We must try once more, in the words of a great nineteenth-century statesman, 'to establish public rights as the common law of Europe'. 'But that is just what the League has failed to do.  Will it not simply fail again?;  I do not think the failure was due in the main to diplomatic flaws in the drafting of the Covenant; it was due in part to many political misfortunes and errors of diplomacy on which I need not dwell, but in the main to a fundamental lack of will and understanding in our Western Civilization as a whole. The words of M. Ryti's broadcast to the U.S.A., as reported in the Times of December 4th, 1939, are incontrovertible: 'If Finland should perish, it would be only "because there is not between the civilized nations the necessary solidarity which would protect the weak from violence". If the neutral nations were indifferent to the fate of other neutrals, they would be "digging the grave of those nations which desire to build up their existence on justice and on respect for the laws, but whose means are inadequate if they are compelled to fight a superior invader".' It may be that, through laziness and lack of thought, through reliance on old habits, through the power of reactionary or sinister interests, together with various other causes, our present-day Western Civilization is unable to make the necessary effort to defend itself; if so, it is for certain doomed, and we are moving towards another Dark Age.  But I do not think the evidence at present points to any such disastrous conclusion.  The experience of the last twenty years has taught Europe much, and the outbreak of the present war has caused a new awakening both of reason and of conscience.  In this country at least there has been a great pro- cess of Education, and where in 1918 a hundred persons under- stood the principles of the Covenant a million understand them now.  The fundamental source of failure has largely been removed; and it is well worth while to consider what improvements in the Covenant may make the carrying out of its obligations easier and more effective. To begin with the most difficult point of all, and the one on 17

Transcription: success might be attained by a consistent and determined policy of constructive peace and co-operation in France and England? Such a policy would have saved the League, and it may, if steadily pursued, save European Federation. I do not think it in the least true that 'Europe must federate or perish'.  Europe must co-operate or perish; must prevent war or perish; but it would be a delusion, and a most unfortunate delusion, supposing the various obstacles on which we have touched should make actual Federation at the end of the war unattainable, to give way to despair and imagine that no other steps were worth taking for preserving the general peace. We must not underrate the intensity of the passion for inde- pendence, especially in those nations in which it has been lost or imperilled.  I received on November 20th a letter from a friend in Finland: 'If war comes, we just know that this generation, men and women, must lay down their lives for the future, for freedom. In my young years we fought for our independence; now every- body knows what a priceless, unique, possession that is.' We must not be surprised or disappointed if nations, especially small nations, are suspicious of all federal treaties which seem to put their vital interests under the control of foreign powers.  We start from the basic fact that the nations of Europe have many divergent interests, habits of thought, national customs, social standards, and historical traditions; but all have one supreme common interest, the suppression of war.  If they will unite for that, and then by regular co-operation for good and mutually beneficial purposes learn to trust each other, it may be best to leave them the fullest national freedom in other respects.  After all, the suppression of war by itself implies a considerable surrender of what is called 'sovereignty': the abandonment of force as an instrument of national policy, the acceptance of third-party judgment in disputes, and - hardest of all - the protection of each member of the society by the united strength of the whole.  Co-operation in the faithful discharge of those duties, as prescribed by the Covenant, leads inevitably towards Federation: I think it would be most unwise to insist that Federation must be a preliminary condition to their discharge. II. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS In considering the function of a world-wide, or appoximately world-wide, Society of Nations in a world in which one or more close Federations have been successfully established, the first question that arises is the fundamental one of Security, 14 Mutual protection is the prime object and often the sole object, of any 'Society of Nations', whether Federal or Confederate.  The Federation will, presumably, act as a united whole to defend its members; but will that be enough to secure the general Peace, and can we therefore relieve the general body of the most arduous of its present obligations?  Sir John holds very emphatically that we can and must.  If once relieved of the duty of maintaining 'peace indivisible' by united action against the peace-breaker, the League would lose the one quality which now makes it objectionable to many countries, such as Germany, Italy and Japan, and might well become a really universal body; moreover, it is argued, the loss would not be a serious one, because the duty in question is one which the League has seldom been able or willing to perform. (Sir John somewhat darkens counsel by putting prevention of aggression in the same category as punishment of the aggressor, and implying that the supporters of the League demand the 'punishment of the wicked'.  I should make it clear at the outset that the supporters of sanctions are not in any way concerned with punishment.  We are concerned with the prevention of war beforehand or with the stopping of war if it has already broken out.  This principle applies equally to Federation and to League.) Now if a Federation could be formed as extensive as the whole of Europe or as Mr. Streit's collection of fifteen democracies; and if, further, it could be absolutely relied upon to protect its own members against aggression, the general cause of Peace would no doubt be greatly advanced, and the nations protected by the Federation might well be content to leave the rest of the world to its fate. With any federation short of those indicated the question would hardly arise.  A Danubian Federation, a Scandinavian Federation, even a Federation of England, France, and parts of Western Europe, would be fairly strong for self-defence but could not be an authoritative guardian of the general Peace.  For example, if at the end of this war Europe is left with those three federations, a dis- satisfied Germany, an aggressive Russia, an Italy on the lookout for pickings, and the rest of the world as it is now, it would be idle to pretend that there was not crying need for a strong League of Nations, if it were at all obtainable. That is to say, if there were a Federation fully resolved to defend its weakest member and so extensive as to affect, if not to comprise, most of the world, it might be reasonable, and even desirable, to aim at getting the general League as nearly universal as possible 15

Description: Ratne bojne dopisnice (Feldpost) bile su najfunkcionalnije sredstvo komuniciranja vojnika sa porodicom tokom Prvog svjetskog rata. Većinom su bile cenzurisane i na njima se nalazio pečat vojne cenzure, regimentalni pečat i pečat vojne pošte. Na velikom broju dopisnica nalazila su se sva tri pečata, međutim, nerijetko se nalazio samo jedan ili dva. Poznato je da su vojnici bili strogo kažnjavani ukoliko su svjesno pisali bilo šta što otkriva vojne tajne. Pisati su mogli samo vojnici. Sve što bi napisali davalo bi se vojnom cenzoru da to pregleda i tek kad on odobri moglo se poslati porodici. Čitajući pisma, može se uvidjeti da su ona poprilično štura, te da su dobro pazili o svemu šta je napisano, upravo iz razloga da bi izbjegli probleme sa nadređenim. Feldpost sistem Austro-ugarske Monarhije, omogućavao je vojnicima da komuniciraju sa svojim najbližima. Sačuvane razglednice i pisma pružaju lični pogled na to kako su pojedini vojnici doživljavali sukobe. || Devet bojnih dopisnica (Feldpost)

Description: Este un volum de jurnal din cele trei deţinute de Biblioteca Judeţeană Octavian Goga Cluj. || Dumitru Nistor, ţăran din satul Năsăud s-a născut în 1893. Visând din copilărie să călătorească şi să vadă ţări străine, în 1912, când vine vremea “număraşului” (recrutării) el cere să fie primit nu în miliţia ardeleană, unde erau recrutaţi de obicei românii, ci în marina austro-ungară. Terminând şcoala de marină, după o călătorie la Viena, este îmbarcat ca Geschützvormeister (“primul îndreptător de tun”) pe vasul SMS Kaiserin Elisabeth, cu destinaţia Asia. Prins de război în Marea Chinei, crucişătorul Kaiserin Elisabeth participă la câteva bătălii navale, pentru ca în 2 noiembrie 1914 să se hotărască scufundarea lui. Echipajul pierde şi lupta terestră, este luat prizonier de japonezi şi transportat în arhipelagul nipon. Timp de zece luni, ţăranul-marinar din Năsăud va fi prizonier într-o mănăstirea buddhistă din Himeji, iar apoi mutat într-un lagăr, construit special pentru prizonierii germani şi austrieci, la Aonogahara, nu departe de Kobe, unde va rămâne până la sfârşitul anului 1919.

Description: Potrošačka kartica sadrži podatke o osobama koje su se prijavljivale radi raspodjele živežnih namirnica u Zagrebu tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata. Sadrži podatke o podnosiocu prijave (ime i prezime, adresa) te osobama koje se nalaze u kućanstvu, njihova imena, godine rođenja, odnos prema podnosiocu prijave, zanimanje i mjesto rada.

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