Transcription: On Thurs 13th June there was the French broadcast interpreted by J. Avenal as meaning capitulation. The same night he sent a League courier for his 20 cases of personal effects from Vichy. Told no one - not even Stencek - although 50 officials had sent their heavy luggage there also.  On Sat. 15th I  myself proposed that we shd try to get back our secret papers for destruction, & he raised no objection.       He talked with Charron (who told Vigier) (14/6) that the plan was to put Petain in as P.M. to make an armistice; that decent terms wd be got & that all French abroad wd  then return for reconstruction work. They sounded almost complacent. A. also conducted anti-B-campaign in the days that followed. de Holler, Aghmides & others. 17     This morning he told Giraud (Legal) that A. Hitler was not inamical toward the L/N & thought it had done a good job in the Saar. What is he working up to? What does he respect? Is it sheer comedy or— At 12-30 today the French decision was announced. Also heard that Germans were at Bellegarde. At 8 pm A. called me for the

Transcription: Left page   Tuesday, July 16th S.G. called a meeting yesterday morning. We first dealt with a fresh invitation from Princeton University. Answering the arguments which have been put up, Avenol agreed to a proposal from Loveday that he (L) should communicate the text to the British Government as they have shown a strong interest in the proposal. In the meantime he would inform Mr. Tittman and no further action would be taken at the moment. (This morning there was an additional telegram from Hambro in New York, asking for a copy of the U.S. Government observations). At the meeting we then proceeded with the real object. Avenol opened by references to the great difficulties of the Swiss Government in having the League here, suggested that they might well be under pressure from the Germans on the subject and that we should help, first by going into the Library (and thus looking more insignificant); secondly, a number of officials, including the High Direction who had nothing to do directly with practical technical work, should be sent on leave. He himself proposed to appoint one person to act for him and retire to La Pelouse. He could not resign as that would, he inferred, finish the Secretariat. There was no body in existence at the moment which could authorize his retiring and mentioned as an example that the power-of- attorney given to the Treasurer would lapse and the banks could refuse to hand over our money. De Haller, called for, said that there had been no démarche of any kind from the Swiss Government, but left it to be inferred that the statement of the S.G. would be in accordance with the wishes. At the meeting it became known that there were now only 65 international officials and about 35 Swiss, out of the 600 which were here twelve months ago. It was also mentioned that the salary list was at the moment about 30% lower than that envisaged in the Vichy plan. Skylstad raised questions of principle as to consulting Governments and mentioned two of his technical men (Health and Opium) who were necessary, but who were being dismissed. In a subsequent talk with some of my colleagues we came to the conclusion that Avenol might send away Aghnides, Skylstad and  myself and probably wish to appoint de Haller who has lately been on mission for him to Bern. I pointed out that Agh wd be a more likely instrument. Last night I got pretty reliable news from Vichy that the Government there had first decided simply to leave the League at once; this was changed later (confirming Ganem's story) to maintaining the decision to leave the League, but postponing the date of giving notice sine die. Events apparently (according to my informant) led to a change and on Sunday the  Right page   14th, there was said to be a new decision, that the French Government would not leave the League, but that in view of its political implications, they could not continue to have a French Head of the Secretariat! The events causing the change are not altogether clear; there is said to be less confidence that the Germans will treat France with a certain amount of consideration. Troubles have arisen in minor ways with the occupying forces, the central authorities being ignored. One suggestion is that the decision to hold on to the League may be in a very minor way a sign of less subservience. - Another suggestion is that, under pressure from the Axis, Roumania having just announced her departure and to follow hurriedly in the foot-steps of Hungary, Albania, Roumania, it would be politically undignified. Whatever the reason, the story if true, may very much affect our position here. It may for one thing decide Avenol to hasten up his preparations to clean the Secretariat of" recalcitrant" members of the High Direction. On the other hand it might lead him to give up some of his political schemes and retire with what dignity he may. It may also affect political events. The League is a very slender thread, still representing some link between Europe and the outside world and its maintenance here might begin to have a little promise of contacts other than that of a continent united by conquest & bound into a subservient economic unit. Personally I had almost given hope up thinking of possible political implications, being concerned more with what I called a reasonably clean finish. We shall see. To-day I saw de Haller and after some general talk remarked that the S.G. had based his plan very largely upon the wishes and interests of the Swiss Government and that I knew he had been sent to Bern a few days before to consult and inform the Swiss Government. De Haller again assured that there was no démarche, although it might well have been the impression given by Avenol's statement. As to Avenol's proposal, it is not in itself a bad one and it is a great pity that we have all completely lost confidence and trust in him.

Transcription: Left page   entrusted to us all: seeing that something of the League of Nations should survive; events might go all in the direction in which he anticipated, but our own duty remained in my eyes quite clear. During an interview the same day with Ag. he added to his violent abuse of the British an attack on the U.S. and even contemplated that the French army in Syria would attack the British in the rear and was somewhat astonished when it was pointed out to him that this might lead to Turkish intervention; the Turks, who would not want the Italians in Syria, were on very good relations with the Soviets.  Note in the margin   wrote draft letter to Avenol. End of dictated notes  Right page   M Phelan The Stockholm SOCIALDEMOKRATEN of 5.7.40 published the following DNB despatch from Geneva, distributed by the Swedish Press Agency TT: "Almost all English officials of the League of Nations left Geneva on Wednesday and Thursday. There were about 90 persons, and it is understood that one of them was the former English Under-Secretary General Lester. It is supposed that the party passed through non-occupied France to the Spanish frontier.  It is also stated that the International Labour Office will move to South America." Sth 9/7 40 The facts: about 15 British officials from SdN & B.I.T. left for England by bus. Mr. Lester still at has not left.

Transcription: For some time J.A. has been discussing with individuals in Secretariat and outside, possibility of forming a Directoire. The idea seemed to be that this committee consisting of a few outsiders and a few insiders (including J.) would be responsible with him for conduct of affairs - virtually hand-picked substitute for Council, Assembly and Supervisory Committee. I know he approached BHT and BQN. [Burckhardt Swiss & Bourquin Belgian] Saturday July 6th Yielding to request J.A called Directors meeting and examined staff list in view to reductions. Certain number were agreed to, but additions were also proposed to those lists for retention; surprisingly it was a very substantial list and not the 6 to 12 people he had mentioned. Reflecting however, I saw the list was almost exclusively [continental] European, or near European and sent him a note urging that international character of staff be maintained (the 8th of July). At the same meeting I asked if and when our budget would be drawn up for 1941. J.A said he could not do it without Supervisory Committee. I suggested telegraph communication with the Chairman (Hambro). He said that telegraphic communication was not a substitute for a meeting Also that the political position of certain people would be changed by events (there is some talk of a puppet Government being set up in Oslo). meeting quite good. reasonable in tone. We all expected firewordks. Ag. didn't sleep much night before. Nor did I.

Description: Ratne bojne dopisnice (Feldpost) bile su najfunkcionalnije sredstvo komuniciranja vojnika sa porodicom tokom Prvog svjetskog rata. Većinom su bile cenzurisane i na njima se nalazio pečat vojne cenzure, regimentalni pečat i pečat vojne pošte. Na velikom broju dopisnica nalazila su se sva tri pečata, međutim, nerijetko se nalazio samo jedan ili dva. Poznato je da su vojnici bili strogo kažnjavani ukoliko su svjesno pisali bilo šta što otkriva vojne tajne. Pisati su mogli samo vojnici. Sve što bi napisali davalo bi se vojnom cenzoru da to pregleda i tek kad on odobri moglo se poslati porodici. Čitajući pisma, može se uvidjeti da su ona poprilično štura, te da su dobro pazili o svemu šta je napisano, upravo iz razloga da bi izbjegli probleme sa nadređenim. Feldpost sistem Austro-ugarske Monarhije, omogućavao je vojnicima da komuniciraju sa svojim najbližima. Sačuvane razglednice i pisma pružaju lični pogled na to kako su pojedini vojnici doživljavali sukobe. || Devet bojnih dopisnica (Feldpost)

Description: Este un volum de jurnal din cele trei deţinute de Biblioteca Judeţeană Octavian Goga Cluj. || Dumitru Nistor, ţăran din satul Năsăud s-a născut în 1893. Visând din copilărie să călătorească şi să vadă ţări străine, în 1912, când vine vremea “număraşului” (recrutării) el cere să fie primit nu în miliţia ardeleană, unde erau recrutaţi de obicei românii, ci în marina austro-ungară. Terminând şcoala de marină, după o călătorie la Viena, este îmbarcat ca Geschützvormeister (“primul îndreptător de tun”) pe vasul SMS Kaiserin Elisabeth, cu destinaţia Asia. Prins de război în Marea Chinei, crucişătorul Kaiserin Elisabeth participă la câteva bătălii navale, pentru ca în 2 noiembrie 1914 să se hotărască scufundarea lui. Echipajul pierde şi lupta terestră, este luat prizonier de japonezi şi transportat în arhipelagul nipon. Timp de zece luni, ţăranul-marinar din Năsăud va fi prizonier într-o mănăstirea buddhistă din Himeji, iar apoi mutat într-un lagăr, construit special pentru prizonierii germani şi austrieci, la Aonogahara, nu departe de Kobe, unde va rămâne până la sfârşitul anului 1919.

Description: Potrošačka kartica sadrži podatke o osobama koje su se prijavljivale radi raspodjele živežnih namirnica u Zagrebu tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata. Sadrži podatke o podnosiocu prijave (ime i prezime, adresa) te osobama koje se nalaze u kućanstvu, njihova imena, godine rođenja, odnos prema podnosiocu prijave, zanimanje i mjesto rada.

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